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DEREGULATION AND PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION:
SECOND BITES AT THE APPLE
JAMES T. O'RELLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The lowly apple figures frequently in modern political meta-
phors. Freedom from excessive regulation is as American as apple
pie; regulation takes a bite out of American business; and there is
something unfair about giving people a second bite at the apple.
Private causes of action in federal courts to enforce regulatory re-
quirements are the "second bites at the apple" of modern regula-
tory control. Private enforcement actions adversely affect the cli-
ent groups of modern administrative law, including regulated
manufacturers, municipalities, and other persons. This Article ad-
dresses that set of "second bites" from the viewpoint of the "ap-
ples" affected by this new challenge to the regulated communities.
Private cause of action theories are divergent, but in general, a
"private cause of action" can be defined as a private person's right
to invoke a federal enforcement statute against another private
person in a civil suit. The suit has its jurisdictional base in the
regulatory command of a particular federal command and control
statute.1 Administrative agencies typically enforce regulatory stat-
utes, as in the case of violations of Rule 10b-5 of the federal securi-
ties laws.2 The decline in regulatory enforcement, brought on by
* Lecturer in Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; corporate practice, Cincinnati,
Ohio. B.A. Boston College, J.D. University of Virginia.
1. Discussion of a "private right of action" in this Article refers to an express or implied
power of an individual civil litigant to invoke a statute, which creates or preserves a public
regulatory interest, as one of the independent grounds of action in a suit which otherwise
would involve traditional tort or other civil law concepts. See generally R. PmRCE, S. SHA-
PIRO, & P. VRKum, A MiNIT RATIVE LAW & PROCESS § 6.4.12 (1985); Hazen, Implied Private
Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil
Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1333 (1980); Stewart & Sun-
stein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L REv. 1193 (1982).
2. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986) for Securities and Exchange Commission regulations
proscribing fraudulent trade in securities. An agency has the power to determine primarily
whether a violation has occurred and to conduct an "adjudication." See also 5 U.S.C. § 551
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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:235
budget considerations and policy changes, however, has shifted en-
forcement toward private injunctive and tort actions.' Private en-
forcement of federal laws is common in antitrust law and in mod-
ern environmental regulation. Gradually, however, private actions
are becoming a new subspecies of product liability litigation, with
even greater use expected in the future as budget reductions re-
duce direct enforcement by federal agencies.4
Apart from private causes of action, a separate set of "initiation
rights" cases have enabled private persons to sue to force govern-
ment action against regulatory violators. The impact of these
court-ordered agency actions has been most noticeable during the
deregulation efforts of the Reagan administration. The wisdom and
consequences of the initiation cases have been amply debated
elsewhere.6
II. NEW TRENDS
Two major advances in rule-making policy represent important
factors in the private enforcement of federal regulatory standards.
Neither is novel, but each is a central theme of current administra-
tive agency enforcement. The first is the rise of performance stan-
dards, and the second is mandatory self-reporting of violations.
(1976) (imposition of a sanction such as a civil penalty or a cease and desist order). In
addition, an agency may bring the violator before a federal district court to initiate a civil or
criminal enforcement action. Private actions also may implement the statutory prohibitions
of the Securities Act.
3. Several commentators and agencies have noted a statistical decline in enforcement ac-
tions by agencies. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus Calls EPA Enforcement Record "Terrible", De-
mands to See Prompt Improvement, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1723 (1984); FoOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION TALK PAPER T86-1 (Jan. 2, 1986) (FDA court actions declined by at least
50% in the 1977-85 period). The largest citizen suit for penalties was decided in 1986 under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982), and resulted in a
$1,285,322 penalty. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304
(4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 872 (1987) (No. 86-473).
4. The funding reductions resulting from the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, Pub. L. No.
99-177, 99 Stat. 1063-85 (1985), have disproportionately affected the staff and resources
available for enforcement in some agencies.
5. The "initiation" of an agency action by court order is similar to mandamus, but "initia-
tion" results in a court-determined timetable for the agency action. See, e.g., Public Citizen
Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The best
treatment of the initiation rights theory appears in Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 1, at
1205.
6. See generally Hazen, supra note 1; Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 1.
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A. Performance Standards
Performance standards are the less precise federal agency regu-
lations, which prescribe certain policy goals without specifying the
means by which regulated entities are to achieve them.7 These
standards can include product, service, or conduct rules governing
private sector activity. Performance standards offer flexibility:
They allow industry to satisfy a regulation in cost-efficient-albeit
less easily monitored-ways with creative, inexpensive solutions.
For example, the directive, "One should check airplane engines
appropriately" is a performance approach, in contrast to the spe-
cific commands in a Federal Aviation Administration airworthiness
directive containing 500 pages of specific directions for parts, re-
pairs, and inspection.8 Application of the former would encourage
creative, cost-efficient solutions crafted by individuals, because
regulated entities may employ various means to accomplish identi-
cal goals. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration haz-
ard communications standard which became effective in 1985-86
best exemplifies the trend toward the performance standard ap-
proach." OSHA consciously opted for a performance approach in
the final rule requiring workplace chemical labeling. 10 This ap-
proach reversed the Carter administration's effort to define partic-
ularized chemical classifications and label warnings.1"
The recent expansion of tort plaintiffs' use of federal regulations
will significantly affect judicial interpretation of and deference to
administrative policy decisions. Where once regulatory require-
ments were a shield, they now may be a sword. This Article
predicts that future plaintiffs may challenge the adequacy of pri-
vate sector compliance by asserting violation of agency perform-
7. Several studies of regulation define performance standards well. See, e.g., S. BREYE-,
REGULATMN AND ITS REFORM 105 (1982).
8. Agencies are encouraged to utilize a "performance" rather than a "design" standard
wherever feasible. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
9. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1985).
10. See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983). The debate over the performance orientation of this
standard is expressed in the preamble to the final standard. Id. at 53,296-97.
11. Compare the final standard, particularly as to hazard identification, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200 app. A, with the former administration's more particularized Hazard Identifica-
tion Proposed Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 4,412 (1981).
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ance standards in individual product liability actions, and that
plaintiffs also may use novel remedies to enforce standards.
B. Reporting Obligations
The use of mandatory reporting obligations is the second current
administrative law trend that intersects with the geometric rise in
private suits. This standard requires that regulated entities report
detailed, often adverse, information about their products or prac-
tices to the government.12 When a firm is required to reveal to the
agency and thereby to the public that the firm has violated the
law,13 failure to do so has significant implications for private tort
suits.
Mandatory reporting of product problems has become a require-
ment in the regulated manufacture of automobiles, aircraft, chemi-
cals, pesticides, medical devices, drugs, microwave ovens, and
many other products. 4 Although reporting deficient products
serves a social need, it encroaches on traditional privileges against
self-reporting of violations to police agencies.15
Failure to report can bring civil penalties, and willful nonreport-
ing is punishable by criminal and civil actions. Moreover, courts
have upheld mandatory reporting requirements on statutory e and
12. Several statutes require reporting adverse risk information. Examples include laws
governing toxic spills into water and potential dangers from consumer products. See, e.g.,
Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1982); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1982).
13. For example, it is a violation of the Consumer Product Safety Act for a manufacturer
of a product subject to a mandatory safety standard to distribute in commerce a product
which does not meet that standard, 15 U.S.C. § 2068 (1982), yet the manufacturer must
report such a noncompliance as soon as it is discovered. Id. at § 2064.
14. See, e.g., reporting on automobiles, National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (1982); on aircraft, 49 C.F.R. § 93.3(a) (1985); on chemicals, Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1982); on pesticides, Federal Insecticide Fun-
gicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) (1982); on medical devices, Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(i) (1982); on drugs, id. at § 355(j)(1); on microwaves and
other electronic products, Radiation Control for Safety and Health Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 263g(a)(1) (1982); and consumer products, Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2064(b) (1982).
15. But cf. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253-54 (1980) (mandatory reporting of oil
spill does not violate self-incrimination rights).
16. The duty to report has been upheld against challenges to the agency's regulations.
See, e.g., Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 484 F. Supp. 513, 517-18 (D.D.C. 1980).
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constitutional17 grounds, despite objections based on the self-in-
crimination privilege.
Congress has accepted the controversial practice of mandatory
self-reporting in several statutes.18 Agencies also have implied
power to compel such reports in several contexts in which the stat-
ute failed to give express authority for reporting rules.19 In either
case the requirement has a major impact on the availability of a
private cause of action against the regulated entity. Because re-
porting often is linked to a trigger phrase such as "unreasonable
risk" or "defect," the admission of such a risk can have drastic
consequences for the firm making the report: Unless an appropri-
ate disclaimer is accepted by the administrative agency, the firm
may leave itself open to private product liability suits.20
The intersection of private enforcement cases and mandatory re-
porting has been an interesting development. Several varieties of
federal civil actions have arisen in recent years. Litigants have
brought traditionally state-based product liability actions into fed-
eral courts when the product's manufacturer failed to notify the
government about the product's deficiencies.2 1 The statute typi-
cally allows the agency to penalize the firm which failed to report,
but only after the product deficiency met a statutory test of "de-
fectiveness. 2 2 The proof of defective status has varied with the
17. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Ford Motor Co. v. Coleman, 402
F. Supp. 475 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 927 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1982).
19. See Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 484 F. Supp. 513,517 (D.D.C. 1980); see
also 49 C.F.R. § 21.3 (1985).
20. Disclaimers are typically included to blunt the effect of the defect notice, but the
defect notice itself is often admitted into evidence in civil trials arising out of the alleged
defect. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 370 Mass. 69, 73-76, 345 N.E.2d
683, 687-88 (1976) (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration recall notice).
21. See, e.g., Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 560 F. Supp. 288 (N.D.N.Y. 1983);
Wahba v. H & N Prescription Center, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Butcher v.
Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D. Md. 1981).
22. The statutory defect threshold is an integral part of the penalty scheme. Beyond a
preliminary finding, the agency is not required to meet the full levels of proof as to the
existence of the defect in order to reach the legal threshold for an order compelling the
manufacturer to provide notice of the defect. United States v. Ford Motor Co., 421 F. Supp.
1239 (D.D.C. 1976), afi'd in part, 574 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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particular legislative history concerning a specific product, recog-
nizing qualitative as well as quantitative differentiations.2 3
When the private tort plaintiff alleges violation of a reporting
rule, the judge's perspective on administrative policy is altered.
The federal court views the new reporting obligations from the
point of view of the plaintiff rather than from that of the govern-
ment, which wrote, promulgated, and interpreted the rules. A pri-
vate tort action in these circumstances gives the plaintiff the lux-
ury of targeting a particular defendant's decision not to report
with clear and convincing hindsight. The administrative agency,
meanwhile, has its policy rationales argued by persons with little
or no involvement in that policy. To make matters worse, a lack of
resources may preclude the agency from taking an active part in
the dispute to explain its policies.
Arguably, exploitation of agency rules by private parties benefits
a resource-constrained agency. In the past several years, many fed-
eral courts have found the relatively dormant section 15 reporting
duties of the Consumer Product Safety Act and the automobile de-
fect reporting system relevant to product liability plaintiffs' ac-
tions.24 Ironically, these cases produced a level of controversy, de-
terrent potential, public attention, and widespread industry
attention for agency rules which the government could not have
achieved on its own.
The recent trend in case law granting private enforcement rights
to injured plaintiffs as "private attorneys general" 25 is manifest in
parallel enforcement efforts by government and private enforcers
23. Note that Congress may include the number of deficient products as a criterion, or it
may treat each deficient product as a separate "defect" for which reporting is required.
Compare Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1982) (defining "product haz-
ard" in part as a defect which "because of ... the number of products distributed in com-
merce . . ." creates a risk to the public) (emphasis added) with Radiation Control for
Health and Safety Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 263g(a)(1) (1982) (requiring reporting of any
defect in any product distributed in commerce).
24. For example, defects in automobiles have been developed by a line of judicial cases
which have differed from the small number of administrative cases interpreting "defect"
under the Consumer Product Safety Act. See, e.g., United States v. Ford Motor Co., 453 F.
Supp. 1240 (D.D.C. 1978).
25. In this context the "private attorney general" is enforcing one of the newer statutory
protections common to all consumers and citizens. This Article does not address the eco-
nomic protections of antitrust and securities law which also permit private enforcement
rights. The "private attorney general" concept is not new. See Associated Indus. of New
240 [Vol. 28:235
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in many product safety contexts. Problem reporting in the drug
industry is well established, but regulations revised in 1985 have
intensified the effort.26 The revised regulations prescribe that
sponsors of a new drug product file mandatory product adverse re-
action reports with the Food and Drug Administration.
Two recent cases illustrate the juxtaposition of private and pub-
lic rights. In 1985, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania convicted a drug firm of criminal viola-
tions for not reporting adverse reactions.28 In the second case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit awarded mil-
lions of dollars in punitive damages for failure to report the same
type of adverse reactions to the FDA.29 The former case involved
an ambiguous duty to report medical case information obtained
from other nations.30 Plaintiffs in the latter case asserted that fail-
ure to report adverse reactions of American patients had been indi-
rectly responsible for one plaintiff's injuries.3 l The FDA had used
its regulatory authority to require reporting in some instances, but
had not required reports if a product was in a class for which
premarket approval reports were not required. The plaintiff in the
tort action asserted that the court should read the ambiguous regu-
lation to compel reporting, and the court agreed.2
Private enforcement of reporting requirements is thriving be-
cause of the relative ease with which litigants can bring reporting
York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1943), reu'd per curiam on other grounds, 320
U.S. 707 (1943).
26. 21 C.F.R. § 314 (1986).
27. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1986).
28. See United States v. Smithkline Corp., Crim. 84-0227 (E.D. Pa. 1985); cf. United
States v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IP85-53 CR (S.D. Ind. 1985) (similar outcome). Both cases
were settled with negotiated pleas for the corporation and individual defendants.
29. Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceuticals Inc., 718 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1983).
30. Allegedly, defendants failed to report to the Food and Drug Administration that a
product had caused severe reactions among several patients in Northern Ireland clinical
observations. Prior to the 1985 revisions, the regulations on adverse information reporting
were ambiguous as to the rapidity and duty of reporting for this particular type of adverse
drug information. Smithkline, Crim. 84-0227, - (E.D. Pa. 1985).
31. See Stanton, 718 F.2d at 555. This case involved severe birth defects alleged to have
been associated with the use of a local anaesthetic supplied by defendant.
32. Id. at 562-63. On advice of counsel, the Stanton defendants believed that their prod-
uct was outside the literal coverage of the problem-reporting regulations because of its his-
torical status as an "old" drug rather than the fully reporting set of "new" drugs for which
certain mandatory reporting rules applied. Id. at 560-61.
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violations into federal court. Although courts customarily accord
deference to agencies such as the FDA in their fields of primary
jurisdiction, the inclusion of a private right of action in a statute
infringes upon the responsible agency's ability to exercise its pri-
mary jurisdiction to enforce the statute.
III. CONCEPTUAL DIVISIONS
Conceptually, private rights of action can be subdivided into ex-
press statutory rights and implied or judicially created rights. Aca-
*demic attention has begun to focus on the creation of parallel pri-
vate rights by the federal courts in their construction of federal
statutes.38 With one exception, 4 the Supreme Court generally has
been hostile to such implied rights arguments.3 5 Commentators ob-
serve that courts will have a difficult time implying new causes of
action in the face of such reluctance by the Supreme Court.3 '
Recent congressional grants of private rights are somewhat
clearer than the older implied-rights statutes. Proponents of the
legislation assert that the suits require no public expenditures and
argue that the public benefits from the case precedents. Opponents
contend that negotiating restraints on agencies' own investigatory
or prosecutorial powers is difficult enough. The true advantage of
creating private rights by statute is avoiding the criticism that
courts usurp the legislature's job when they imply new causes of
action.3 7 In addition, adopting rights of action in legislative pack-
33. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, supra note 1, § 6.4; Hazen, supra note 1, at 1333;
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1193.
34. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
35. "Congress' decision to withhold a private right of action and to rely instead on public
enforcement reflects congressional concern with obtaining more accurate implementation
and more coordinated enforcement of a regulatory scheme." Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3245 (1986). In earlier cases, the Supreme Court has disfa-
vored the creation of private causes of action without a showing of congressional intent.
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For a good analysis of the Supreme Court's actual and
perceived trends, see Hazen, supra note 1, at 1286, and Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 1, at
1304-07.
36. See generally R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, supra note 1; Hazen, supra note 1;
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 1.
37. Creating an express cause of action eliminates the need to debate the social benefits of
the judicially implied rights of action. The protected class of persons probably will pursue
the statutory remedy. If a statute protects a limited class, courts will recognize their private
right of action, absent clear congressional intent to the contrary. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
[Vol. 28:235242
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ages is simpler for potential plaintiffs than constructing public pol-
icy arguments for judicial implication of the rights. The legislative
process is inherently one of tradeoffs: Legislatures can "cheaply"
insert or remove private rights from a piece of substantive legisla-
tion, such as a reauthorization bill for a federal agency. Private
rights sections rarely should make or break a bill's prospects for
passage.38
Dean Pierce 9 and Professors Sunstein, Hazen, and Stewart"
have published excellent articles on private rights of enforcement
of regulatory statutes, and have laid the intellectual foundation for
analysis of the case law. The Sunstein-Stewart treatment con-
cludes that "entitlements," the specially protected rights of admin-
istrative law, are the basis for judicially created private rights."
Entitlements are minimal levels of a benefit to which a person
gains either a statutory or constitutional guarantee. Persons with
entitlements enjoy special protection from removal of the benefit.42
Because the case law of entitlements in the context of adjudicatory
due process safeguards consumes many pages of administrative law
scholarship, an entitlement theory as a basis for private rights of
action is relatively easy to understand. 43 The courts look at the
rights and duties created by the statute in order to find an analogy
to common law entitlements. Where this form of entitlement ex-
ists, the courts allow the individual to enforce those statutory
rights. Sunstein and Stewart conclude, however: "Private lawsuits
ner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374 (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
33 (1916)).
38. In a legislative struggle for the creation of a new statutory set of rights, for example
rights for consumer product safety or chemical regulation, proponents of the legislation,
typically including private rights advocates and adversaries representing an established con-
stituency, advocate inclusion of private enforcement remedies. Because the adversaries usu-
ally concentrate their efforts on substantive issues, procedural issues routinely do not attract
attention. An exception was the 1980 passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act ("Superfund"), in which the bill's opponents elimi-
nated a private enforcement provision. See Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency
Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 DuKE L.J. 261, 270 n.21 (private rights removed before
final passage).
39. See Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regula-
tion, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281 (1980).
40. Hazen, supra note 1; Stewart and Sunstein, supra note 1.
41. Stewart and Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1307-16.
42. Id.; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
43. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPRo, & P. VERKU--., supra note 1, § 6.4.
1987] 243
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are a poor forum for reconciling the social norms involved in regu-
latory programs. . it is difficult for courts to know whether crea-
tion of a particular private right of action will promote economic
welfare.
' 44
From the viewpoint of regulated firms facing not only regulatory
agencies but also private litigation challenges, private rights of ac-
tion offer even less benefit to society than Stewart and Sunstein
foresee. Regulation promotes social goals only if it remains predict-
able, well directed, and systematic. An unforeseen precedent estab-
lished in a private case can have a disruptive effect on the ability
of an agency and firms to reach compromise and common under-
standing.45 An agency's overall program may suffer because of an
unfavorable court precedent created by ad hoc litigation.46 That
precedent may reduce interpretive certainty for the regulated com-
munity, particularly if the court is not inclined to defer to an inter-
pretation which an agency previously followed as a matter of infor-
mal "working law."'47 Loss of predictability imperils the enforcers'
programs. The incentive to cooperate in an anticipatory fashion
decreases.48
44. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1320. This article was cited with approval in
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3245 (1986).
45. For example, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has devoted most of its ef-
forts to negotiating voluntary corrective action plans arising out of defects. See 1985 CON-
SUMER PROD. SArFEY COMM'N ANN. REP. app. F, at 71. The introduction of a major additional
liability on top of the settlement remedy threatens the Commission's ability to settle dis-
putes. This additional liability is increasingly prevalent in the new wave of private actions
discussed infra at notes 75-84.
46. For example, a judge can determine that a certain number of fires occur before a
refrigerator is considered to have a "defect" either in a Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion initiated enforcement case, see, e.g., In re White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 1 Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Guide (CCH) 75,093 (Nov. 3, 1975), or in a private suit by a purchaser
against the manufacturer to which the Commission is not a party. In the latter case, the
defective nature of the refrigerator would be the basis for a separate cause of action in
which the private plaintiff attempts to show that the manufacturer breached a duty to re-
port the defect.
47. A reviewing court customarily accords deference to the factual determinations of the
administrative agency. As the agency decision becomes a less formal interpretation matter,
deference decreases.
48. Typically, a private entity adapts to the regulatory system and conforms without the
governmental expense of enforcement actions. The regulator, in turn, makes small adjust-
ments in the regulatory scheme to suit the needs of the regulated firm. S. BREYER, REGULA-
TION AND ITS REFORM (1982), provides a good insight into this accommodation.
244 [Vol. 28:235
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The Sunstein-Stewart article favors private rights of action when
the relationship between rights and duties in the administrative
program is similar to those established by common law entitle-
ments.49 Courts may then "ordinarily provide private remedies
without exceeding their competence, subverting legislative control
of regulatory policy, or contradicting any of the reasons for the cre-
ation of an administrative enforcement system."50 Courts, however,
may not be able to create and police these private rights of action
without significantly displacing administrative certainty. Deter-
rence through certainty is a key reason for the operational success
of this nation's administrative enforcement system.
IV. SEEKING CERTAINTY
"Interpretive certainty" is nothing more than one's best guess, as
counsel to a regulated client, that an agency will act in a certain
way under a given set of facts. Today's administrative law practi-
tioners, who must watch the agencies' internal movements for signs
of enforcement trends, are the descendants of the Romans who
read the future in the entrails of a fowl. Although the process is
not exact, experienced agency watchers can predict with some ac-
curacy how a given agency will regulate. An attorney's value to the
client is much diminished if he or she loses this ability to forecast
agency behavior. Private rights of action make prediction more
difficult.
Interpretive certainty is important because government agencies
rely heavily on voluntary compliance by regulated entities in order
to implement regulation. The primary agency leverage is persua-
sion and common long-term interests in cooperation. An agency
also may utilize occasional prosecutions and other forms of deter-
rence to maximize the reach and effectiveness of a statute. Regu-
lated firms must be able to predict what an agency's interpretation
of a statute will be so that they can operate within its terms. Regu-
lated firms or persons generally plan their construction, operation,
marketing, or other activities to stay within the boundaries of per-
missible conduct. The persuasiveness of agency interpretations is
diminished when private litigants cause courts to interject their in-
49. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1307-16.
50. Id. at 1321.
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terpretations of regulatory statutes.51 The more fluid the meaning
of a regulatory standard, the less easily affected firms can live
within its bounds.
The private cause of action substitutes for agency inaction or
supplements weaker action.52 In so doing, private enforcement per-
mits the courts to interpret regulatory statutes, wholly apart from
the intentions of the regulatory managers to whom the statute del-
egated rule-making or adjudicative powers." The private action
plaintiff invites the courts to eschew the delegation of "primary
jurisdiction" to agencies6 ' and to resist norms of deference to
agency interpretation.
Loss of administrative certainty, on the other hand, is attractive
to those who oppose a status quo of accommodation between the
regulator and the regulated firm. Critics who assert a "capture"
theory55 in which agencies operate so as to accommodate their reg-
ulated constituents would almost certainly hail a decrease in
agency certainty. Private causes of action can lead courts to re-
verse or modify "captured" agency policy. In this way litigants can
break down a pattern of accommodation between an agency and
regulated firms.
Although private causes of action may reduce complicity be-
tween regulated entities and captive agencies, the cost is too high.
51. Because of the relatively slow pace of civil litigation, an agency may construe a statute
itself between the time the private action is filed and the time that an appellate court
reaches a final decision. In the interim, the agency could seek deferential acceptance of its
interpretation. The agency is not guaranteed such acceptance because of the different status
of the private plaintiff and the private litigation's separate goals. As a non-party, the agency
presumably would have to intervene in order to articulate its position unless the court exer-
cised its discretion to grant an amicus status.
52. In the case of inaction, the private enforcer theoretically will pursue the same result
as the agency would, although such an assumption remains open to debate. In the case of
weak agency action, supplementary private litigation may nudge the agency toward control
of the errant private entity.
53. The delegation of power to interpret statutes to an administrative agency is a signifi-
cant legislative decision. Recognizing private causes of action forces an agency to share that
power with individual litigants and the courts.
54. In the first instance, primary jurisdiction recognizes the agency's authority to deter-
mine questions of statutory construction within its realm of expertise. United States v.
Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
55. The "capture" of a regulatory agency by its constituency is a recurring theme in the
academic scholarship of administrative law. See, e.g., R. PIRcE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL,
supra note 1, § 1.7.2 (1985).
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Conflicting administrative and judicial interpretations of regula-
tory statutes create too much uncertainty and confusion for those
who must abide by the statutes. In particular, this interpretive un-
certainty discourages the voluntary cooperation by regulated par-
ties on which the effectiveness of the administrative system
depends.
V. RIGHTS OF ACTION V, RIGHTS OF INITIATION
In their study, Professors Sunstein and Stewart note that courts
that deny implied private rights of action nevertheless sometimes
will grant rights of initiation. A right of initiation is a mandatory
injunction compelling an agency to adopt rules or create a court-
supervised timetable for actions. 58 For example, plaintiffs have
sought orders directing OSHA to regulate certain hazardous chem-
icals ahead of other items on the agency's list of rule-making
projects. 57 Other plaintiffs have sued to compel the Environmental
Protection Agency to comply with provisions of the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act 58 and to demand that the FDA clear the mar-
ketplace of untested drugs within a certain period of time.5 9 These
initiation actions have become more and more common; Public
Citizen and other advocacy groups are often successful with initia-
tion suits in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. These groups have earned significant press at-
tention by using initiation suits as political statements.6 0 The com-
mon elements in initiation suits are a policy disagreement between
the advocacy group and the agency, a statutory directive, and a
program which has been less rapid or less complete than the plain-
tiffs originally envisioned.
Initiation actions against agencies differ in some important re-
spects from private suits against regulated entities. Initiation suits
56. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1205.
57. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1157-58 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (per curiam).
58. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
59. Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1979); American Pub. Health Ass'n v.
Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1972).
60. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (per curiam); see also Taylor, Group's Influence on U.S. Environmental Laws, Poli-
cies Earns It a Reputation as a Shadow EPA, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1986, at 50, col. 1.
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affect the government agency directly, while private actions only
indirectly affect agency policy."1 An initiation suit may force an
agency to put aside scheduled business to comply with court-or-
dered action, while it may take longer for the effects of a private
suit to be felt by the agency. The private suit is not directed
against an agency, but against an individual who has not followed
agency directives. An initiation case, on the other hand, questions
whether an agency has met its statutory duty. A successful initia-
tion suit can deplete agency resources and wound the pride that
agency managers have in control of agency policy.6 2
Private initiation suits cost agencies more time and money than
do private rights of action. A successful initiation plaintiff can
compel an agency to reverse direction, alter its priorities, and un-
dertake actions which the court finds more meritorious. In one
rule-making case, for example, the court ordered submission of a
list of other projects so that the agency could identify the opportu-
nity costs of time spent on the court-ordered project instead of the
agency's list of priority projects.6 3
An initiation action also has more political impact than a private
right of action. The latter results only in payment of money dam-
ages, while the former compels an agency to reshuffle its budget or
enforcement schedules.64 The typical private enforcer wauts only a
cash award, while the private initiation plaintiff typically seeks a
policy shift. By definition, the agency begins its defense of an initi-
ation case with a wholly different political view than that of the
challenger. A Public Citizen-type or other advocacy group is likely
to have its own view of the priorities an agency should have. The
initiation suit is a natural outlet for conflicts between advocacy
groups and government agencies resulting from this divergence of
61. Private actions sometimes impact the government indirectly. For example, an action
determining that the FDA and regulated drug firms had not considered adequately the
safety of certain vaccines would result in a damage award, but also would affect the FDA's
ability to encourage beneficial development of a regulated vaccine market.
62. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(per curiam).
63. Id.
64. Initiation cases may affect the appropriations process, refocus attention on the weak-
nesses of an ambiguous statute, or be a basis for statutory revision by Congress. None of
these consequences would necessarily flow from a private damages remedy.
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views. This ideological controversy is generally absent in the pri-
vate tort cases enforcing regulatory statutes.
Initiation cases suffered a setback in 1984. In Heckler v. Cha-
ney, 5 the Supreme Court addressed the problem of how the FDA
could control the non-approved uses of FDA-approved drug prod-
ucts. Plaintiffs sought and obtained relief in the circuit court com-
pelling the FDA to initiate certain drug enforcement actions. The
Supreme Court reversed, however, stating a "general presumption
of unreviewability of [agency] decisions not to enforce." 6 The lan-
guage in Chaney put strong limits on court-ordered enforcement
demands in initiation cases, at least those affecting the FDA. Rec-
ognizing that the agency's decision whether to institute enforce-
ment proceedings was "a decision which has long been regarded as
the special province of the Executive Branch," the Court blocked
the plaintiff's attempt to force initiation of administrative civil en-
forcement lititation.67
In Chaney, the FDA confronted an unusual use of normally safe
drugs: execution of condemned convicts by lethal injection. The
statutory scheme of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act allowed the
agency to challenge the use of otherwise acceptable drugs if the
execution-size doses were unapproved under the statutory criteria
for "safe and effective" uses of drug products."" The FDA, how-
ever, opted not to bring enforcement actions against states which
used prescription drugs for lethal injections. In the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, death row
inmates won an order which would have compelled the FDA to
take enforcement action, halting execution by lethal injection. 9
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the claim that private indi-
viduals can compel the FDA to enforce an informal policy by man-
65. 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985).
66. Id. at 1657. Other agencies recently have won similar arguments. See, e.g., Investment
Co. Inst. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 728 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In its most recent
pronouncement on private rights of action, the Court's rejection of implied rights would
support a parallel rejection of the implied rights of initiation plaintiffs. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3234 (1986).
67. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. at 1656.
68. Id. at 1652.
69. Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985).
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dating specific enforcement actions.7 0 The Chaney opinion thus cut
back on private rights of initiation, limiting the class of cases in
which individuals can force an agency to regulate.71
The regulated community must respond to this increasing expo-
sure to private enforcement of regulatory statutes. One possible re-
sponse could be to challenge the standing of private plaintiffs more
frequently 2 and therefore expand judicial controls on privately-en-
forced actions. Another response would be to work toward statu-
tory changes by building understanding among businesses and
other target groups about the consequential damage done to their
interests by a proliferation of statutory rights of action.
The business community should devote legislative efforts to re-
vising the several statutes from the 1970's which have provided for
private enforcement. Regulated businesses have overlooked their
individual cost of defending private enforcement actions, as well as
the cost to businesses generally of the attendant loss of regulatory
predictability.73
An understanding of how these new civil actions impact on in-
surance and tort exposure is also important. Most injury cases can
be resolved with traditional common law remedies for negligence
and nuisance. Statutorily created torts and remedies, however,
place an added burden on insurers and manufacturers because
these potential defendants must now plan for the wider range of
recovery available to the enterprising challenger. Affected busi-
nesses should seek a congressionally imposed standing requirement
that would limit the capacity of private plaintiffs to bring suit.
70. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. at 1659. The Court stated, "[W]e essentially leave to Congress, and
not to the courts, the decision as to whether an agency's refusal to institute proceedings
should be judicially reviewable." Id.
71. The Court stated that "[t]he general exception to reviewability provided by [the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act] remains a narrow one, . . . but within that exception are in-
cluded agency refusals to institute investigative or enforcement proceedings, unless Congress
has indicated otherwise." Id.
72. The question of "standing" concerns a particular plaintiff's right to assert a public
right as the basis of a civil suit. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
73. With the exception of the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1980), Congress has paid relatively little
attention to private causes of action during debates over the adoption of regulatory
legislation.
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VI. CASE STUDIES
A. Consumer Product Safety Act
Recent Consumer Product Safety Act cases illustrate the
problems created by the casual inclusion of citizen suit provisions
in safety legislation.74 The 1972 CPSA requires that manufacturers
notify the Consumer Product Safety Commission when the manu-
facturers discover information concerning substantial product
hazards. The government then decides whether to initiate a prod-
uct remedy, such as a recall.75
In practice, the reporting requirements of section 15(b) of the
CPSA have worked well, entailing informal notification and infor-
mal agreements to voluntarily repair or recall. The Consumer
Product Safety Commission has had to challenge a firm for failure
to report in only a handful of cases. In those cases, however, the
parties usually reached settlements for reduced penalties with lit-
tle difficulty." More recently, however, private plaintiffs have used
section 15(b) to obtain pendent jurisdiction.7 7 Although manufac-
turers have won a few cases,7 8 most federal courts have granted
jurisdiction, and found significant damage liability as well, on the
rationale that a consumer has a right to enjoy the benefit of the
manufacturer's notification to the Commission79 and a cause of ac-
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1982). This right of action was amended in 1976 to make it
more attractive by award of costs, attorney's fees, and expert witness expenses "in the inter-
est of justice" rather than only to the prevailing party. Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion Improvements Act of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-284, § 10(d), 90 Stat. 507 (1976).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1982). In the event the manufacturer did not file, the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission, after opportunity for a hearing, could declare the prod-
uct a "substantial product hazard," id. at § 2064(f), and could penalize the failure to report.
Id. at § 2070.
76. Settlements of nonreporting cases have been frequent. See generally 1985 CONSUMER
PROD. SAFETY COMM'N ANN. REP. app. F. A 1986 case resulted in a $90,000 consent settle-
ment civil penalty in a case involving baseball pitching machines. Pitching Machines Time-
liness Case Settled for $90,000, 15 Prod. Safety Letter No. 19, May 12, 1986, at 1.
77. See, e.g., Drake v. Honeywell, Inc., 797 F. 2d 603 (8th Cir. 1986); Butcher v. Robert-
shaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D. Md. 1981).
78. See, e.g., Drake v. Honeywell, Inc., 797 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1986); Kahn v. Sears Roe-
buck & Co., 607 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Morris v. Coleco Indus., 587 F. Supp. 8 (E.D.
Va. 1984).
79. See, e.g., Wilson v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 600 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ind. 1985);
Payne v. A.O. Smith Corp., 578 F. Supp. 733 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Young v. Robertshaw Con-
trols Co., 560 F. Supp. 288 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F.
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tion to enforce that right as well. The theory is that had the manu-
facturer reported the defect, the government's remedial action
would have prevented the injury. Under this reasoning, the con-
sumer is the principal and the Commission the agent for purposes
of consumer protection."0
Such suits have both positive and negative implications. On one
hand, when a consumer plaintiff brings a section 15(b) action, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission expends none of its own re-
sources for enforcement, the consumer obtains a second opportu-
nity for damages, and the non-reporting penalty's deterrence
power expands. On the other hand, however, a single failure by a
manufacturer to report can result in multiple private tort actions s
In addition, state rather than federal law governs both punitive
damage awards and statute of limitations issues.8 2
B. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
A more potent regulatory system, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, has been the subject of repeated attempts at private enforce-
ment in recent years. No private right of action has been estab-
lished. 3 If one were created, however, thousands of new federal
district court cases would result. The FDA's sweeping jurisdiction
touches thousands of tort and contract actions now fought under
common law tort principles. A small claims action over a sale of
Supp. 692 (D. Md. 1981); Swenson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 374 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 1985), cert.
denied 106 S. Ct. 1998 (1986).
80. Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692, 701 (D. Md. 1981).
81. The statute does not limit claimants' ability to recover damages. Many plaintiffs can
recover for the same unreported "defect." See, e.g., Wilson v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 600
F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Payne v. A.O. Smith Corp., 578 F. Supp. 733 (S.D. Ohio
1983); Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 560 F. Supp. 288 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Butcher v.
Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D. Md. 1981); Swenson v. Emerson Elec. Co.,
374 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 1985), cert. denied, 106 U.S. 1998 (1986).
82. For example, a consumer asserting a cause of action under the Consumer Product
Safety Act must look to state tort law for punitive damage and statute of limitations issues.
See Payne v. A.O. Smith Corp., 578 F. Supp. 733, 736-38 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
83. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not permit private rights of enforcement
action. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc. v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3237 (1986); Pacific
Trading Co. v. Wilson & Co., 547 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1976); National Women's Health
Network, Inc. v. A.H. Robbins Co., 545 F. Supp. 1177, 1178 (D. Mass. 1982); Keil v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 490 F. Supp. 479, 480 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
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stale popcorn-an "adulterated food" subject to seizure84 -might
be litigated in federal district court. The prospect of defending
tort, sales, financing, and contract claims that assert noncompli-
ance with FDA standards would threaten hundreds of food packag-
ing and processing firms' ability to reasonably comply with regula-
tory standards.8 5 A circuit court finding for a plaintiff would create
an interpretation of the FDCA binding on regulated entities even
though the FDA itself had taken no action and had shown no in-
terest in accepting the offer of private "help" in enforcing its
statute.88
C. Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission Act is another statute which
would be altered radically by allowing implied private rights of ac-
tion. Antitrust actions under the federal antitrust laws often sup-
plement the Federal Trade Commission's antitrust mission.8 7 If,
however, the FTC's regulation of "unfairness" of advertising8 be-
comes the subject of private civil suits, for example, the avalanche
of case law, as Acting FTC Chairman Calvani recently suggested,89
84. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1982).
85. The FDA actively enforces the federal good manufacturing practice standards for food
manufacturing plants, 21 C.F.R. § 113 (1986), by inspections of food manufacturing and
storage facilities. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
86. The Supreme Court has denied federal jurisdiction for a product liability action based
on violations of FDA requirements. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc. v. Thompson, 106
S. Ct. 3229, 3244-45 (1986). The FDA has not been receptive to the creation of a private
right of action. The agency fears challenges to its priorities similar to the challenge at-
tempted in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Critics have noted that the FDA may
settle for too little activity, and some critics have recommended more private rights. See,
e.g., Note, The Food and Drug Administration's Power to Recall A Harmful Product and
Other Remedial Actions: The Powerless Consumer, 10 VT. L. REv. 129 (1985). In the FDA's
defense, one may argue that multiple private actions with contradictory proposed solutions
would impair uniform enforcement of FDA regulations nationwide.
87. In the enforcement of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982 & Supp. II 1984), and the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), private actions are expressly recognized in the statute
and well established in the courts. Mergers and the Private Antitrust Suit: The Private
Enforcement of Section VII of the Clayton Act, 1977 A.B.A. SECTION OF AN=RUST LAw.
88. The Federal Trade Commission Act proscribes "unfair" actions, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(1982 & Supp. II 1984), and though the term is vague, its enforcement is constitutionally
valid because of the FTC procedural steps which provide an adequate safeguard through
adjudication. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comr'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
89. A recent news report quoted Calvani as encouraging private litigation over allegedly
deceptive advertising claims. "If Pepsi-Cola believes Coca-Cola is running an unfair ad,
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would increase geometrically employment among Washington law-
yers. When Congress narrowly defeated a bill to create a new Con-
sumer Protection Agency,90 its choice not to adopt an institutional
"master enforcer" of private rights through interventions in the
administrative process had far-reaching effects. Although private
antitrust actions occur frequently, Congress has been reluctant to
authorize the expansion of private causes of action into the purely
economic policing role of "supporting" governmental economic reg-
ulation.9 1 As a result, regulated plaintiffs with economic disputes
are limited to "initiation" actions or to special unfair competition
remedies such as the Lanham Act.9 2 Congress apparently has been
more willing to permit private suits in environmental and safety
legislation because it perceives these statutory actions as entirely
new remedies for traditional nuisance, personal injury, or negli-
gence wrongs, rather than alternate forms of economic regulation.
VII. NEW WAVE
The newest wave of private causes of action might be called "hy-
brid section 1983 actions." ' s These civil rights actions against state
or local government officials, which arise under the "laws" of the
federal regulatory scheme, include challenges to a state's failure to
properly implement regulatory or beneficiary statutes. 4 Plaintiffs
Pepsi is fully capable of bringing its own case." See Quote of the Week, FTC Watch No.
226, Jan. 24, 1986, at 16, col. 2.
90. The Consumer Protection Agency legislation ultimately failed in the House by a vote
of 227-189. See H.R. 6805, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The role of the proposed Consumer
Protection Agency would have been to intervene in regulatory agency proceedings to effec-
tuate consumer interests. The bills had been alive, but extremely controversial, since the
first passage of such a bill in 1970. The chronology of defeat of the measure during 1970-78
is detailed in 5 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., CONGRESS AND THE NATION 255-56 (1981).
91. Antitrust litigation serves purposes which can be quantified and measured by stan-
dard commercial and statistical indicators. The questions of safety involved in "defective-
ness" include cost-benefit choices and other complex issues better suited to expert analysis
by agencies.
92. The Lanham Act provides another channel for litigants to protect their commercial
interests against unfair competition. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). See generally Marx,
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Statutory Cause of Action for False Advertising, 40
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 383 (1983).
93. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), has generated a great deal of
civil rights enforcement litigation asserting that injury to the civil rights of the plaintiff
occurred under color of state action.
94. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 1.
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have claimed federal statutory bases for section 1983-style actions
as they challenge unenforced seat belt laws, disregarded environ-
mental requirements, and improperly administered welfare bene-
fits.9 5 The cause of action is a hybrid of an individual civil rights
remedy and state enforcement of a federal protective measure. The
private right of action is not against the federal agencies them-
selves but against the state implementers.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, for example,
delegates enforcement of certain safety requirements to the
states.9 Certain states adopt federal requirements for chemical la-
beling and documentation pursuant to the OSHA Hazard Commu-
nication standard.9 7 Civil plaintiffs who oppose federal regulatory
restraints get another bite at the apple with these quasi-section
1983 challenges to these state-adopted standards. If the states are
slow to enforce the OSHA hazard communication rule, plaintiffs
can employ these derivative section 1983 suits as private causes of
action. Workers or their unions who object to a federal OSHA pol-
icy decision can act against both state government and employer
defendants by pursuing these actions."8 A successful lawsuit might
induce the court to construe the state-adopted OSHA final stan-
dard to suit the purposes of the private plaintiff. Such an outcome
would raise interesting issues of federalism and precedential effect,
which would require the attention of the Supreme Court.
95. A section 1983-style action challenges a state agency and a private party for violating
the plaintiff's rights under the "constitution or laws of the United States," 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In this context, emphasis is on the violation of "laws," particularly regulatory statutes.
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1982). States have the power to enforce the Occupational Safety
and Health Act after federal approval of a "state plan." Id. The state plan's approval is
conditioned upon parallelism between federal and state protections of workers. See 29
C.F.R. § 1902 (1985). State plans are in operation in 21 states and two jurisdictions. Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Health and Safety of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (statement of William E. Brock, Secretary of Labor).
97. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1985).
98. The union could not sue an employer alleging a violation of the Occupational Safety
& Health Act. Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Conm'n, 713 F.2d 918 (2d
Cir. 1983). Commentators, however, have offered suggestions for union suits against employ-
ers. See, e.g., Hollis & Howell, The Occupational Safety & Health Act: Potential Civil
Remedies, 10 FORUM 999 (1975); Comment, The Assertion of Statutory Rights Under FLSA
and OSHA: Expand or Limit the Gardner-Denver Rationale, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 361.
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In his dissent in Maine v. Thiboutot, 9 Justice Powell listed the
many federal regulatory and beneficiary statutes that permit pri-
vate rights of action for inadequate local or state government per-
formance, including the urban mass transit program, small busi-
ness investment legislation, historic building preservation, and
outer continental shelf legislation.100 Using section 1983 causes of
action to compel enforcement of these statutes, private litigants
could force a state administering a federal program to be the vehi-
cle for changing the nationwide program. A civil injunction com-
pelling one state to operate the program as the private litigant de-
mands would be a difficult precedent for other states to ignore. 10'
Such an order would take on a hybrid nature, not unlike initiation
cases, to the extent that the remedial order might compel the fed-
eral program to adapt to the state case precedent. 02 This poses
fascinating supremacy clause and preemption issues which go well
beyond traditional uses of section 1983 for welfare and food stamp
denial cases.1°8
VIII. THREE NEW EXAMPLES
Three examples of private rights of action recently have caused
controversy; each offers intriguing insights into the federal litiga-
tion of the future. For example, Congress enacted the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Release, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (Superfund)10 4 in an atmosphere of uncertainty and great
controversy. During the final stages of debate, Congress eliminated
a private right of action which would have allowed residents
around a hazardous waste site to enforce a right to have the area
99. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
100. Id. at 34 (Powell, J., dissenting).
101. See id. at 32-34.
102. The indirect compulsion would come as potential state government defendants press
the federal agency to modify its requirement in order to eliminate the newly "discovered"
theory of liability. The exposure to liability should be removed through rule-making
changes, which both allow interested parties to participate and provide for public notice, 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1982), than by relitigating that same liability in subsequent product liability
cases.
103. Traditional § 1983 litigation has not involved worker occupational rights issues or
other broad-reaching regulatory commands.
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
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cleaned. 10 5 In a conscious decision made in light of various uncer-
tainties, Congress decided that the EPA should lead a single fed-
eral enforcement effort.
The 1986 version of Superfund, by contrast, created private
rights of action against governments, entities, or persons in viola-
tion of the act.10 6 Congress included the right in direct response to
arguments that the government had not been sufficiently aggres-
sive in normal enforcement channels.10 7 Whether and to what ex-
tent a government challenge to a waste site will preclude private
persons from challenging the same site or company remains un-
clear at this point.108 At a minimum, however, the priorities for
cleaning up sites must change as more rapid and aggressive private
litigants take part in the development of judicial precedent under
Superfund. The private rights which Congress rejected in 1980 and
then accepted in 1986 will be extremely unpredictable as they play
out in the courts.109
The same Superfund legislation permits initiation suits, in which
plaintiffs could charge the EPA with inaction if it fails to perform
a non-discretionary act.110 The barrier to initiation suits is higher
than the barrier to individual suits asserting private rights, yet the
private suits frequently seek more profound changes in the EPA's
interpretive boundaries."' Private suits against regulated entities
often seek to ultimately restrict the agency's freedom of action or
105. Superfund proponents acceded reluctantly to the removal of the private cause of
action as the bill passed during the last days of the 97th Congress. Anderson, Negotiation
and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261, 270 n.21 (history
of Superfund legislation).
106. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 206,
100 Stat. 1613, 1703-04 (1986).
107. Proponents of the insertion argued for a private supplement to governmental en-
forcement priorities. See Anderson, supra note 105, at 270 n.21.
108. The language of the two Superfund amendments contained many ambiguities. The
Conference Committee agreed to restrictions on the private causes of action which are per-
mitted under Title II. SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORIZATION AcT OF 1986, HR
CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 309-11 (1986).
109. Under the 1986 legislative revisions to Superfund, litigation will be less predictable
because of the many changes in the program.
110. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 206,
100 Stat. 1613, 1703-04 (1986).
111. See id. This proposition assumes that the private litigant has been unable to get the
government agency to deal directly with the enforcement issue, often because of a disagree-
ment about the scope or interpretation of the agency's authority.
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prioritization. Although an initiation suit against the agency itself
might reach the same goal, private actions can do the same job.112
The Justice Department faces increased problems in opposing
private parallel enforcement actions in this time of fiscal con-
straint. The Land and Natural Resources Division, for example,
which prosecutes Superfund cases, and the Civil Division's Con-
sumer Affairs Section, which prosecutes safety and auto cases,
might have 4.3 percent fewer attorneys after the Gramm-Rudman
budget legislation goes into effect. 113
Superfund's new private rights will be a poor substitute for a
national enforcement system administered by federal regulators.
Federal legal managers, such as EPA enforcement directors, ulti-
mately may enforce statutes themselves less often than watch from
the sidelines as private plaintiffs bring tort and other actions
under statutory enforcement powers. If the Justice Department
cuts back on the participation of government counsel in civil ac-
tions affecting agency programs, removing the government as a "si-
lent partner" in the plaintiff's action, then regulatory precedents
will be shaped by default. More significantly, those precedents are
likely to bear little relation to established agency policy; private
plaintiffs, after all, cannot be expected to promote the govern-
ment's priorities for toxic waste disposal.
114
The OSHA hazard communication standard on chemical label-
ing illustrates a second, indirect impact of private causes of action.
This standard became final in 1983 and first was enforced in
1986.115 The Occupational Safety and Health Act did not include
an express right of action for workers or other private plaintiffs,
and courts have refused to imply a direct private cause of action.
112. If we assume that sovereign immunity will not bar direct actions against the agency
because the government will not be a party, the plaintiff has an easier burden of enforcing
private rights than in an initiation suit. The initiation suit's relatively greater burden of
establishing a mandatory duty under the statute, and then enforcing that duty with stand-
ing and other jurisdictional prerequisites, will pose significant barriers for the plaintiff.
113. See Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985).
114. Superfund operates from a National Priority List. Private plaintiffs could sue to
clean up a lower-ranked waste site without regard for the greater risks posed by other sites
higher on the EPA's list. The EPA has tried to accommodate conflicting demands for scarce
resources. See, e.g., EPA Allows Otherwise Unqualified Sites on Priority List If They Pose
Health Threat, 9 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 640 (Sept. 20, 1985).
115. 29 C.F.R, § 1910.1200 (1985).
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Nonetheless, private litigants often have used the reports and find-
ings of OSHA as weapons in tort liability cases. In the twenty-one
states that enforce the act's requirements under "state plan" juris-
diction, private plaintiffs could assert that individual workers or
unions have a section 1983 right to enforce protections against in-
jury which could be regulated under the act by the designated
state agencies.116 The hazard communication rule-making program
is significant because each affected firm determines which of its
chemicals is "hazardous."117 Consequently, each regulated
firm-and potential defendant-makes its own decisions about the
chemical safety labeling and data sheets for the firm's products. If
a potential litigant alleging injury from chemical exposure dis-
agrees with the OSHA policy decision about a performance stan-
dard, the litigant might use a section 1983-type action in a state
which has enforcement authority. Alternatively, the plaintiff could
urge the court to imply a civil right of action from the Act." '
In a novel third type of action, the maker of a chemical pesticide
sued the agency which regulated its product for factual flaws in the
agency's risk assessment. Great Lakes Chemical Corporation had
been named as a defendant in a private action alleging that its
EPA-registered pesticide had damaged the plaintiff.111 Great Lakes
challenged the EPA risk assessment upon which the private liti-
gant sued arguing that the EPA's faulty risk finding, which gave
rise to the plaintiff's theory of injury, was based on a poorly done
EPA study. This flurry of cross-complaints and challenges assert-
ing regulatory "malpractice" should serve as a warning to pesticide
manufacturers, and, by analogy, to regulated manufacturers in
general. The uncertainty inherent in such expanding theories of li-
ability almost certainly will make investors reluctant to invest in
firms subject to private suits. In addition, litigation frequency, ex-
116. The claim of power arises out of the section 1983 rights addressed by Justice Powell
in Maine v. Thibutot, 448 U.S. 1, 33 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
117. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, app. A (1985).
118. Implying a private right to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Act is a for-
midable task because of the contradictory legislative history arising out of the debates on
passage of the Act in 1970. See Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
713 F.2d 918, 926 (2d Cir. 1983).
119. Ammons v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 10 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 573 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 1, 1986). Great Lakes cross-claimed against the EPA, but the cross-claim was dismissed
on July 23, 1986. Id.
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pense, and loss rates are all factors that determine business liabil-
ity insurance costs. Civil actions to enforce rights such as those
arising under the pesticide law may be a major source of insurance
premium increases for American industry.
IX. FUTURE ROLE OF COUNSEL
Lawyers working in the administrative law field should become
more attuned to the consequences of private causes of action. The
private or corporate attorney's role as counsel to agencies and to
companies is to assess how product liability, telecommunications,
advertising, or other conflicts are best handled in light of the in-
vestment which rides on the decisions to be made. If private rights
of action continue to appear more frequently, counsel must obvi-
ously provide advice about such private rights of action so that
their clients will be able to better anticipate the uncertainties such
rights can create.
The first step in serving the client is to understand the terms of
the relevant statute. The attorney must determine whether the
statute provides initiation rights or private rights; that is, whether
the statute creates powers to force government to act, or powers to
enforce the statute with a private civil complaint.120 Second, coun-
sel must examine the case law surrounding the statute to learn
whether private rights of action have been implied judicially.
Courts have implied private rights for a wide variety of statutes.12
The broad extent to which some courts have been willing to imply
private rights of action may surprise the private sector counsel ac-
customed to dealing with one decision point at one agency, but
that surprise perhaps illustrates the particular importance of this
step in the counsel's task. The third step is to outline for the client
120. The statute usually includes a separate paragraph or subsection creating such a pri-
vate right of action, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1982), or implies such a power in reasonable
terms relating to civil enforcement actions.
121. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 740 n.20 (1982) (noting District Court's
recognition of a private cause of action under 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (1976), 18 U.S.C. § 1505
(1976)); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (private cause of action under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982); Fairview Township v. EPA, 773 F.2d 517 (3d
Cir. 1985) (private cause of action under Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982)); cf.
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974)
(implying a private cause of action in labor disputes under Amtrak Act, 45 U.S.C. § 547
(1970)).
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the conditions that might precipitate a private suit.122 The attor-
ney should assess the prospects that a third party will sue the cli-
ent for the conduct which a government agency has found accept-
able. As recent private action cases demonstrate, agency
acceptance does not necessarily estop private plaintiffs, who may
be expected to create novel causes of action as the stakes of the
litigated question become greater.
X. CONCLUSION
Statutes empowering private plaintiffs to bring civil actions to
enforce federal requirements for product safety and environmental
health are not prudent, even in light of diminishing federal en-
forcement budgets. The availability of such actions is likely to
flood the courts with private suits. The marginal benefit of more
frequent policing of violators will be offset by the high cost of less
predictable regulatory outcomes-predictability that is essential to
a stable regulatory system.
Private sector opposition to the private cause of action has been
slow to develop. Regulated firms should do more to challenge the
rationale for judicially implied rights of action. These firms also
should direct more creative arguments toward seeking legislative
limitations of those statutes which now expressly grant private
causes of action when the statutes come up for reauthorization. Fi-
nally, firms should encourage judicial limitations by seeking to dis-
miss private enforcers' challenges for lack of standing.123
Ultimately, we must ask what "problem" we "fix" when we allow
uncontrolled private enforcement of regulatory standards. If the
problem is regulatory inactivity, the legislative branch should cor-
rect the agency's internal or external enforcement problems or in-
crease its enforcement budget. Society should not expect ad hoc
litigants to do the work of regulatory agencies without carefully
considering the consequences of such privately directed precedents
122. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (construing Securities &
Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1982)). See generally Frankel, Implied
Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553 (1981). Prosecution of 10b-5 securities law violations is
perhaps the best known type of private enforcement.
123. Reauthorization offers the best legislative forum for presenting Congress with a ra-
tionale against private rights of action.
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and private reinterpretation of agency priorities on national regu-
latory policy. As tight budget years narrow the agencies' power to
police their domain, private litigation offers a facially attractive al-
ternative means to enforce agency policies. The risks, however, of
inconsistent results, curious lines of case authority suited to pri-
vate rather than public goals, and variable objectives should be sig-
nificant drawbacks. Regulatory.uncertainty will adversely affect so-
ciety. From the point of view of the apple-the regulated
person-just one bite of regulatory sanctions is enough.
